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Despite their explicit focus on reaching the poor, 
many community driven development (CDD) projects 
have been found to be only mildly pro-poor in their 
funding allocations. This paper presents evidence of 
an explanation that has been overlooked in the CDD 
literature to date: the requirement that beneficiaries must 
apply for projects in order to receive support. The authors 
first examine data on the universe of project applications 
and funding under Tanzania’s flagship CDD program, 
Tanzania’s Social Action Fund, and then use a census of 
100 program villages to examine the determinants of 
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contacted at bozler@worldbank.org.  
both program awareness and program participation at 
the household level. The data paint a consistent picture 
at both levels: wealth, access to information, and political 
capital are important correlates of the ability to navigate 
the application process successfully. The centrally dictated 
features of this decentralized program appear to be the 
most effective mechanisms in directing funds to the poor. 
The results suggest that unless demand-driven projects 
can develop ways of soliciting engagement from a broader 
cross-section of the population, they are unlikely to 
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1.  Introduction 
Over  the  past  two  decades,  community-driven  or  community  based  development 
(CDD/CBD) has become an increasingly common way to distribute public assistance, and is 
intended  to  provide  a variety of  benefits  including  better poverty targeting,  improved  social 
capital, and capacity building at the local government level. Mansuri and Rao (forthcoming) 
estimate that the World Bank allocated $32 billion for CBD and CDD development projects 
between 1999 and 2007. They argue that the current wave of interest in localized participatory 
development  started  as  a  reaction  to  “top-down”  development  aid  that  was  “…  deeply 
disconnected from the needs of the poor, the marginalized, and the excluded (p. 2).” 
Social  Funds  projects,  which  were  created  in  the  1980s  to  mitigate  the  impacts  of 
structural  adjustment  programs,  allow  local  stakeholders  to  determine  investment  decisions 
(World  Bank,  2002).  Over time, these projects  took  on many  of the characteristics  of  CBD 
programs  and  became an important  part of the social  protection strategy in  many  countries. 
While social funds initially funded public goods from a menu of infrastructure projects that 
communities could choose from, they have recently been used to deliver private goods to the 
poor, such as cash transfers or grants for income generating activities. 
Despite the fact that the poor are explicitly the target group for most of these programs, 
the empirical literature on targeting performance shows that they tend to be only moderately pro-
poor.  For  example,  World  Bank  (2002)  found  that  “…social  funds  projects  have  delivered 
slightly more than proportional benefits to the poor and the poorest. (p. xi)” Given their demand-
driven  nature,  the  beneficiaries  of  these  programs  are  determined  by  who  applies  and  who, 
having applied, gets approved. The literature before us has examined the determinants of being a 
program beneficiary (i.e. the final allocations) in great detail, but we know of no studies that 
decompose targeting performance into applications and, conditional on application, selection. 
In this paper, we exploit a unique combination of datasets to examine the application and 
selection processes at the national and household levels. At the national level, we combine data 
on the universe of project applications and final funding allocations in Tanzania‟s Social Action 
Fund  (TASAF  II)  with  a  poverty  map,  census  data,  and  voting  data  at  the  ward  level  to 
distinguish  determinants  of  applications  from  determinants  of  funding  conditional  of  having 3 
 
applied.
1 We then complement this analysis at the micro level  using data from 100 villages 
across  five  districts  to  assess  respondents‟  awareness  of  TASAF  II  and  their  likelihood  of 
benefitting from it. Because we have data on every household in these program villages, we are 
able  to  examine  the  relative  roles  of  eligibility,  access  to  information,  and  political 
connectedness in exceptional detail. 
At both the national and local levels, our data paint a remarkably consistent picture. At 
the national level, the application process is regressive with project applications significantly 
more likely to come from richer districts. This pattern is strongly correlated with variation in 
access to media and information and with political participation across districts, such as voter 
registration and turnout. The subsequent project approval process is pro-poor, due largely to the 
pre-determined  funding  allocations  made  from  the  center  to  the  districts.  The  progressive 
selection of projects from an initially skewed pool of applications reproduces the familiar finding 
of mildly pro-poor final funding allocations in the literature that precedes us.  
Similarly, at the local level, awareness of TASAF II (which is necessary to apply) is 
positively correlated with education, ownership of a radio or phone, attending village meetings, 
and being related to village elites. Among those who heard of TASAF II, program beneficiaries 
are poorer, but also still more likely to be politically active and live close to the village center. 
Again, while the eligibility criteria imposed by the center ensures that the program is pro-poor, 
we  find  little  evidence  of  pro-poor  selection  of  beneficiaries  within  villages  conditional  on 
eligibility. 
These results point to the importance of political involvement and access to information 
in  determining  who  is  able  even  to  be  considered  by  TASAF  II  for  potential  support. 
Communities must mobilize to agree on and file applications, and households must typically 
participate  proactively  in  order  to  claim  assistance  for  which  they  are  eligible.  Being 
marginalized or poorly educated is likely to make program awareness less likely and navigating 
the application process more difficult. 
Several empirical papers have similarly attempted to measure the relative performance of 
national and local-level governments in poverty targeting. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) analyze 
the Food-for-Education program in Bangladesh, and find that “…the program is mildly pro-
poor” and find no evidence that the center is targeting poor villages. Alderman (2002) similarly 
                                                       
1 The hierarchy of administrative units in Tanzania is Region, District, Division, Ward, and Village. 4 
 
finds that local officials improve targeting performance by using information not available to the 
center. Ravallion (2000) shows that only one-third of the improvement in reaching the poor 
under Argentina‟s Trabajar II program was due to the center‟s ability to reach poor provinces, 
with the rest attributable to better targeting within provinces.
2 In contrast, studies of social funds 
indicate that while the center is somewhat successful in allocating resources to poor areas, it is 
less successful in ensuring that poor households (or poorer communities within these poor areas) 
benefit more from these programs (World Bank, 2002).
3 Targeting performance, especially at the 
central and the district levels, depend largely on the availability of data, and the political will to 
use these data, to target poor areas.
4  
The  primary  argument  that  has  emerged  from  the  literature  so  far  as  to  why  CDD 
programs fail to reach the poor is the idea of elite capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2005). 
A number of studies have examined the differences in policy preferences across elite and non-
elite groups (Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; Olken, 2007; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Rao and 
Ibanez, 2003) and the role of local inequality in permitting elite capture (Araujo et al., 2008; 
Conning and Kevane, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). Most relevant to this paper, local 
political elites can steer funds towards themselves, their extended families, kinship networks, and 
constituencies (Arcand et al., 2006; Besley et al., 2007; Camacho and Conover, 2011). When 
community development funds are used for political purposes they can also influence targeting 
performance (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Khemani, 2010; Schady, 
2000), while corruption can divert scarce resources away from their intended targets (Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2004).  
The strong roles played by access to information and political involvement in our data 
raise the question of whether a form of „informational capture‟ is at play. In practice, social funds 
typically engage in promotion (or sensitization) campaigns to try to disseminate information 
about the availability of funds and program rules as broadly as possible. Many also provide 
                                                       
2  Mansuri  and  Rao  (forthcoming),  summarizing  the  evidence  on  the  performance  of  the  central  vs.  the  local 
authorities on allocating private transfers, find that such programs are mildly pro-poor at best with the targeting 
performance slightly better at the local level. 
3 For example, Paxson and Schady (1999) found in Peru that “there was no intra-district targeting,” and that the 
funds “reached poor districts and, to the extent they lived in those districts, poor households” (Paxson and Schady, 
2002). 
4 For example, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) report that all Thanas in Bangladesh benefited from the Food-for-
Education  program  because  of  political  considerations  and  note  that  this  is  not  uncommon.  Ravallion  (2000) 
describes improvements in Argentina‟s Trabajar II program due to a reallocation of resources across provinces using 
provincial poverty indicators and also giving incentives to provinces for reaching the poor. 5 
 
outreach  (or  facilitation)  to  help  poor  communities  through  the  project  application  process 
(World  Bank,  2002).  Existing  evidence  on  the  effects  of  widespread  dissemination  of 
information suggests that such sensitization efforts should reduce capture (Francken, Minten, and 
Swinnen, 2009; Reinikka and Svensson, 2011; Shankar, Gaiha, and Jha, 2011). However, further 
inspection suggests that such sensitization may be subject to perverse incentives. If, for example, 
central or district level officials rely on local leaders and/or elites to promote these programs, 
they  may  be  reluctant  to  spread  the  word  extensively  in  order  to  steer  benefits  towards 
themselves,  their  extended  families,  kinship  networks,  or  individuals  with  whom  they  have 
patron client relationship – creating a conflict of interest. Such conflicts of interest are likely to 
be felt most strongly at the local level when sensitizers are themselves potential beneficiaries and 
when the beneficiary pool is small. This reasoning suggests that even in the case of sensitization, 
centralized implementation and incentive compatible structures may be needed to neutralize the 
potentially regressive nature of demand-driven development.
 5 We return to a discussion of this 
issue in the conclusion. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes TASAF II in 
more detail while Sections 3 and 4 discuss the data and the estimation strategy. The results at the 
national and the local levels are presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Tanzania’s Social Action Fund Second Phase (TASAF II) 
TASAF is a 120 million dollar project relatively typical of large social funds program in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In its second phase (TASAF II), up to one-third of all Tanzanian villages 
were  expected  to  receive  a  sub-project  by  the  end  of  2010.  Sub-projects  target  three  main 
beneficiary  groups  (intervention  types):  service  poor  communities  (improvement  of  social 
services  and  infrastructure),  food  insecure  households  (public  works  programs  where 
beneficiaries receive cash for work) and vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, people with 
disabilities, widows, orphans, and those affected by HIV/AIDS (grants for income generating 
activities).  
                                                       
5  Olken  (2007)  finds  that  while  central  audits  significantly  reduced  corruption  in  road  construction  projects  in 
Indonesia, community monitoring had negligible effects. 6 
 
TASAF II applications go through an elaborate screening process to guard against the 
types  of  elite  capture  documented  in  other  community  development  programs.  TASAF 
conducted  a  sensitization  campaign  in  which  every  one  of  Tanzania‟s  11,000  villages  were 
supposed to be visited by an official from the district and given information about the program 
and how to apply. There are six key steps in the application process. All villages in Tanzania first 
go through a sensitization process where they are made aware of the application process through 
outreach and training. Applications are then submitted by villages through a form called a Sub-
Project Interest Form (SPIF) which is filled out by village officials and delivered to the district 
TASAF  office.  This  then  goes  through  a  district  level  sector  expert  review  that  judges  the 
technical  merit  of  each  application.  Next,  a  facilitator  from  the  TASAF  II  district  office 
undertakes an Extended Participatory Rural Appraisal (EPRA) which consists of a business plan 
and budget review, an environmental review, and a pairwise ranking exercise that guarantees that 
the project applied for is indeed the one desired by the village.
6 Based on the village decision, a 
Sub-Project Application Form (SPAF) gets filled and is sent for approval at the District office 
and by the District Assembly‟s Finance Committee. Completed SPAFs are finally sent for review 
by the TASAF II Management Unit in Dar es Salaam, and are endorsed for funding barring 
procedural issues. 
This process is designed to be participatory, in that villages are required to undertake a 
number  of  coordinated  actions  in  order  to  initiate  the  application  process  and  verify  the 
application. It is quite rigid, in that applications will be rejected by district officials or by the 
center if they do not satisfy the technical requirements. It is decentralized in that project selection 
takes place at the village level, and all of the important steps of application screening are done by 
district officials. The central office of TASAF II does not reject applications that have been 
properly submitted by district officials, reinforcing the idea that once the funding formula has 
been set and funds have been disbursed to the districts, this process is driven entirely by district- 
and  village-level  decision making.  The allocations  from  the center  to  the districts  under the 
predetermined funding formula were based on a weighted score calculated using three variables: 
population  (40%), geographical  size (20%), and poverty headcount  ratio  (40%). Since using 
                                                       
6 In the pairwise ranking exercise the whole village is called to a meeting, divided into groups by demographics, 
asked  to  come  forward  with  a  number  of  different  project  suggestions,  and  then  village  votes  on  pair-wise 
combinations of these potential projects. 
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these criteria alone could cause vast differences between district councils‟ allocations, 25% of 
the National Village Fund (NVF, TASAF IIs main spending vehicle) was first distributed equally 
to all councils. The remaining amount was then distributed using the composite index. We now 
turn to more details of the data sources used in the analysis.  
3.  Data 
3.1. Institutional Data from TASAF 
This  paper  utilizes  two  main  databases  from  TASAF  II.  The  first  of  these  datasets 
documents every application received by TASAF II between May of 2004 and October of 2007, 
for a total of 102,606 applications. More than 95% of the 2,542 wards in mainland Tanzania 
submitted at least one application, with the median ward submitting 14. The second institutional 
database describes every TASAF II project funded through August 2008, and gives details of the 
beneficiaries, project type, and budgets for each of the 4,037 projects funded. This database also 
shows the composition of funding provided by the NVF, local government authorities, and the 
community itself. NVF spending typically makes up about 80% of total project costs, and is 
never  below  50%.  We  merge  these  datasets  at  the  ward  level  to  calculate  the  number  of 
applications, the percentage of applications funded, and the total amount spent from each source 
per ward.  
3.2.Poverty Maps 
The institutional data on applications, approvals, and funding are overlaid with poverty 
maps,  also  at  the  ward  level,  created  by  the  authors  using  the  method  described  in  Elbers, 
Lanjouw,  and  Lanjouw  (2003).  This  exercise  uses  the  household  surveys  from  Tanzania‟s 
2000/01 Household and Budget Survey (HBS) and the 2002 Population and Housing Census, 
both  conducted  by  the  National  Bureau  of  Statistics  (NBS).  The  HBS  is  a  nationally 
representative sample of 22,178 households sampled between May 2000 and June 2001. The 
HBS  is  a  much  richer  survey  than  the  census,  containing  information  on  a  wide  range  of 
outcomes including demographics, education, health status, and ownership of durable assets. The 
detail of the HBS allows the construction of a rigorous consumption aggregate, but the survey is 
not representative at the district, let alone ward, level. Log per capita household consumption can 
be modeled in the HBS sample using variables that exist in both datasets and then the parameter 
estimates can be used to simulate per capita consumption for each household in the census. 8 
 
These predicted consumption figures are then used to calculate poverty and inequality measures 
for every ward in the country. The poverty mapping data are missing for the islands of Zanzibar 
and Pemba, and so we restrict our analysis to mainland Tanzania.  
Poverty  maps  are  typically  used  by  policy  makers  to  distribute  funding  across  large 
administrative units, such as districts or provinces, but not smaller ones, such as wards, because 
the standard errors for the poverty and inequality estimates become unacceptably large as the 
population size of the units decline. However, in this study, we are only using these estimates at 
the ward level to estimate the relationship between poverty and the likelihood of applying for 
and receiving TASAF II funds. In this sense, the larger standard errors at the ward level should 
only cause attenuation bias, which would drive the effects presented in Sections 5 and 6 to zero 
and therefore decrease our ability to draw inferences with confidence. 
3.3.Electoral Data 
The final data used in the national analysis are from the 2005 presidential, parliamentary, 
and  ward  councilor  elections.  All  data  are  available  online  at  the  website  of  the  National 
Electoral  Commission  of  Tanzania.
7  The  presidential  and  parliamentary  results  are  at  the 
constituency level
8, the councilor elections are at the ward level, and the electoral data is merged 
with the TASAF II institutional data and the poverty maps by ward. The elections took place 
prior to the announcement of the awards of TASAF II projects, and hence we take political 
outcomes as predetermined, and seek to understand how voter registration and turnout, as well as 
voting patterns, relate to application, approval, and funding patterns.  
We calculate voter turnout and voter registration; the former given by the ratio of valid 
votes to registered voters in a ward, and the latter by the ratio of registered voters to population 
in a ward. Both of these variables are intended to measure the political activism of a ward, a 
feature which may make a unit more attractive as a target of pork-barreling, or may indicate a 
heightened level of collective action.
9 
We also define independent variables based on these ward-level electoral outcomes that 
let us test several dimensions across which funding and political behavior may be linked. Given 
                                                       
7 Data available from http://www.nec.go.tz/ 
8 The constituency is a region defined for electoral purposes. The 232 constituencies in Tanzania are typically larger 
than a ward but smaller than a division. 
9 Because the voter registration rate is also driven by demographics (in that one must be of age to vote in order to 
register), we control for the ward-level dependency ratio in our regression models that include voting variables. 9 
 
the  huge  majority  by  which  Chama  Cha  Mapinduzi  (CCM)  candidate  Jakaya  Kikwete  was 
elected to office (over 80% of the overall vote, and higher than that in the mainland part of the 
country studied here) the presidential vote share is not particularly informative. Similarly, 72% 
of  the  votes  cast  in  parliamentary  elections  went  to  the  CCM;  however,  in  ward  councilor 
elections the ruling party is less dominant. We therefore use the vote share for the CCM at the 
ward councilor level to measure intensity of local-level support for the ruling party. We also 
construct  two  co-party  indicator  variables,  which  signify  that  the  ward  councilor  and  the 
parliamentarian are from the same party. The first of these is a dummy indicating any cases in 
which the national and local-level politicians are from the same party. Given the dominant and 
unique position of the CCM, we then define a separate co-party dummy for cases in which the 
councilor and parliamentarian are both from the same party but this party is not the CCM. The 
omitted category for these two dummies is any ward in which the councilor is from a different 
party than the parliamentarian.
10  
3.4.Household Survey Data 
   The survey data come from a listing exercise and household survey conducted in five 
districts of Tanzania between June and December of 2008. First, five districts were selected that 
were intended to be broadly representative of the country as a whole: these are Moshi, Kwimba, 
Lushoto,  Makete,  and  Nzega.  Within  these  study  districts,  TASAF  officials  were  asked  to 
provide  20  villages  in  which  „Vulnerable  Groups‟  applications  had  moved  through  the 
submission process to the point at which they were ready to be funded, but had not yet received 
any money. Thus while the districts that form the study are in some general sense representative, 
the sample of villages was selected based on an endogenous criterion: being at a specific stage in 
the VG application process.  Within  the 100  study villages,  we  interviewed  every household 
using a short listing survey, providing a census of 61,611 households. Each household was then 
sorted into one of the following strata:  
  Village elites (Village Executive Officer, or VEO, and the village chairman, or the VC),  
  Ineligible  households  (i.e.  households  with  no  vulnerable  individuals  as  defined  by 
TASAF and described above in Section 1),  
                                                       
10 Co-party dummy always equals one when the non-CCM co-party equals one, so this dummy tests for a differential 
effect of non-CCM co-parties versus CCM co-parties.  10 
 
  Eligible non-beneficiaries (households with at least one vulnerable individual but not 
benefitting from any VG sub-projects),  
  VG Beneficiaries (households with at least one vulnerable individual and benefitting 
from a VG sub-project). This group was further stratified into two groups: 
o  VG  group  leaders  (chairperson,  secretary,  and  treasurer,  who  hold  signatory 
power over group accounts), and 
o  VG “rank and file” members (the rest of the group conducting the proposed 
income generating activity – with no signatory powers over the group accounts)  
Within each village, a short listing survey was given to every household. The short listing 
survey collected basic demographic information about the household (e.g. household size and 
age of the eldest household members), GPS data, and determined whether or not the household 
contained  a  vulnerable  member.  A  long  listing  survey  was  given  to  all  village  elites,  all 
households with vulnerable members (including VG beneficiaries and eligible non-beneficiaries 
– 38,871 households in total), and to a randomly selected sample of ineligible households. The 
long listing survey collected more detailed data, including household amenities, characteristics of 
the household head, holdings of assets, and basic consumption data. From within this sample, a 
smaller, random stratified (using the strata described above) sub-sample was selected to receive a 
detailed household survey.  
In each of the 100 villages, a household survey was conducted with the two village elites, 
the three group leaders from each TASAF II group, three randomly sampled “rank and file” 
members from each TASAF II group, three randomly sampled households from all “eligible non-
beneficiaries”  in  each  village,  and  three  randomly  selected  households  from  all  “ineligible” 
households in each village. Hence, in a typical village with one TASAF II group funded to run 
an  income  generating  activity,  the  sample  size  was  14.  There  were  1,544  households  that 
completed the household survey in the 100 villages. The household survey contained detailed 
consumption data at the household level, limited consumption data at the individual level, as well 
as collecting information on distance to the village center, the education of the household head, 
asset ownership, participation in village meetings, whether household members hold political 
office in the village, and blood relationships between household memberships and village elites.  
There are 2,542 wards in 119 districts in mainland Tanzania. The poverty mapping data is 
unavailable for 86 of these wards. Out of these, the ward councilor elections were uncontested in 11 
 
254 wards, depriving us of any electoral outcome data besides the party of the victor, meaning 
that regressions using vote shares and turnout are conducted on the 2,202 wards for which both 
poverty and electoral data are available.
11 67 of these wards submitted no applications to TASAF 
II, and so the analysis of the percent of applications funded is conducted in 2,135 wards. Table 1 
provides summary statistics on the ward-level sample in the left panel, and on the household 
survey data in the right. 
4.  Estimation Strategy 
Our estimation strategy is influenced by Galasso and Ravallion (2005) who provide an 
empirical structure for testing the additional contribution of local information gained through 
decentralization. In particular, they define the information set held by the central planners and 
then use a household dataset to construct a much richer definition of „eligibility‟ for the program 
than was available to central bureaucrats. They then attribute the additional poverty targeting 
achieved above and beyond that coming from the planners‟ information set as the benefits arising 
from decentralized targeting. Our approach is inspired by this structure in the sense that the only 
component of TASAF II that was centrally dictated was the allocation of funds to the districts, 
and therefore all within-district targeting arises from the actions of decentralized agents. We 
therefore decompose the variation in targeting efficiency into a cross-district (centralized) and a 
within-district (decentralized) component. Using this structure, we can separately isolate the role 
of the clearly defined funding formula that drives allocation to the districts, and the complex 
decentralized process through which the districts allocate funding to the lower administrative 
levels. 
For each specification we present the univariate correlation between the headcount index 
and the outcome of interest. We then present a multivariate linear regression using an additional 
battery of controls, and we econometrically decompose the overall targeting efficiency into a 




                                                       
11 Uncontested wards are slightly less likely to submit applications than other wards, but are not different in terms of 
poverty or funding than the contested wards included in the expanded analysis. 12 
 
Pooled OLS:      0 1 2 3 id id id id id y P X Z                 (1) 
Between districts:     0 1 2 3 d d d d d y P X Z                 (2) 
Within districts only:    1 2 3 id d id id id id y P X Z                 (3) 
 
where,  id y is  the  incidence  of  spending  (or  the  number  of  applications  or  the  percentage  of 
applications funded) per thousand people in the ward,  id P  is the poverty headcount ratio at the 
ward  level,  and  id X   and  id Z   give  a  broader  set  of  socio-economic  and  political  controls. 
Equation (1) is estimated through pooled OLS, equation (2) is estimated at the district level using 
district averages, and equation (3) includes district-level fixed effects and hence is identified 
using only within-district variation across wards. 
5.  Targeting Performance at the National Level 
5.1. Funding (and Number of Projects) per Capita 
The typical analysis of targeting performance in Social Funds programs examines the 
incidence of spending among the poor relative to the population as a whole. To demonstrate that 
the targeting performance of TASAF II is not substantially different than those found in previous 
studies  (World  Bank  2002),  Table  2  provides  a  first  look  at  the  incidence  of  TASAF  II 
expenditures. The first two columns use the amount of money spent through TASAF II‟s NVF 
per person per ward as the dependent variable. When we regress this variable on the ward-level 
poverty headcount ratio, we see progressive targeting that is statistically precise but relatively 
muted in economic significance. The marginal effects indicate that a ward going from being 
universally non-poor to universally poor would see TASAF II spending per person increase by 
only $1.29 from a base of $2.63. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in the poverty 
rate of a ward (an approximately 20 percentage point increase in the headcount ratio) would 
cause an increase of only $0.25 per person or $5,000 total in a ward with average population. 
These results are typical of the broader literature on CDD that show mildly pro-poor benefit-
incidences. The results in the third and fourth columns, which analyze the number of TASAF II 
projects (rather than funding) per person, are very similar in interpretation and magnitude. 
  Using our rich set of covariates, we can then further analyze these results to understand 
whether TASAF II funding is progressive in a broader sense. In columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, we 13 
 
find that while targeting is progressive on core poverty metrics such as the poverty headcount 
index and literacy, it is also influenced by indicators of political activity and affiliation. Most 
strikingly, the pattern of targeting is strongly determined by the degree of political involvement 
of  a  ward‟s  population:  both  voter  registration  and  voter  turnout  have  large  effects  on  the 
allocation of TASAF II funds. The marginal effects can be directly compared to the poverty 
metric since each is measured as a share: our results indicate that a 10% increase in voter turnout 
is associated with an increase in TASAF II funding that is almost ten times as large as that 
associated with a 10% increase in the poverty headcount index. Furthermore, while funding does 
not respond to the vote share for the CCM, it is significantly higher in wards where national and 
local politicians are both from the CCM, and significantly lower where neither national nor local 
politicians are from the CCM.  
  These results provide the first evidence of a theme that manifests itself throughout the 
rest of our empirical analysis: community development projects, which are demand-driven, put 
the  onus  on  local  actors  to  pull  funding  towards  themselves.  They  therefore  reward 
constituencies  that  are  mobilized  and  capable  of  overcoming  collective  action  problems  to 
successfully seek funding. Because we have rich data on both the demand-driven side of TASAF 
II (applications) as well as the centrally-driven selection process (approvals and rejections), we 
are able to shed light on the specific mechanisms through which this process manifests itself. We 
now turn to an analysis of applications. 
5.2. Applications 
  To  examine  applications,  we  construct  a  dependent  variable  equal  to  the  number  of 
applications submitted by a ward to TASAF per 1,000 individuals. Fewer than 5% of wards 
submitted no applications, with a median of 1.2 and a mean of 3  applications per thousand 
people.
12 The first column of Table 3 gives the OLS relationship between the ward-level poverty 
rate and the number of applications per capita. The strong negative coefficient indicates that for 
every 10 percentage point increase in the poverty rate, the number of applications decreases by 
0.46  per thousand people, or  a decrease of  more than 15% relative to  the mean number of 
applications. Moving from a very rich to a very poor ward would reduce the number of project 
applications by more than 50% 
                                                       
12 The average ward submits 39 applications, and the average district 834. 14 
 
  In  column  2,  we  analyze  the  relationship  between  applications  and  the  additional 
covariates from the previous table. With the addition of these controls, the poverty rate becomes 
insignificant, and the regressive nature of applications is explained by proxy indicators. We find 
that access to media (share of the population with a radio or a mobile phone), voter registration, 
and voter turnout are all strongly correlated with the number of applications. Furthermore, there 
are fewer applications from wards, in which both the local and the national representatives are 
non-CCM. Inequality level in the ward and the share of the ward that is rural are negatively 
correlated with the number of applications. In summary, whether we focus on the magnitude or 
the  significance  of  the  parameter  estimates  in  column  (2),  we  find  that  well-informed  and 
politically active wards dominate the application process. 
  The funding process of TASAF II is divided into two very distinct parts; the centralized 
formula that allocates funds across districts, and then the decentralized process through which 
districts  decide  which  projects  to  fund.  We  now  use  empirical  specifications  (2)  and  (3)  to 
decompose the variation in  applications  into a cross-district  component and a within-district 
component in order to be able to examine these two processes separately. This decomposition is 
important in the analysis of applications because, to the extent that heterogeneity in applications 
is cross-district, it is likely to be neutralized by the cross-district funding formula, while within-
district heterogeneity is not. Columns (3)-(6) of Table 3 perform this decomposition. We find 
that  the  variation  in  the  number  of  applications  is  explained  almost  entirely  by  differences 
between districts rather than within them. Districts that are less poor, have better access to the 
media,  and  are  more  politically  active,  flood  the  system  with  an  inordinate  amount  of 
applications.  We  do  not  see  any  evidence  that  the  variation  in  these  characteristics  within 
districts affects the number of applications. Hence, the results in columns (3)-(6) make it clear 
that the regressive selection in applications is almost entirely across districts.  
5.3. Approvals and Rejections (conditional on application) 
We now proceed to an analysis of the percentage of applications submitted by a ward that are 
approved  and  funded.  This  is  an  outcome  defined  only  for  wards  that  submit  at  least  one 
application,  thus  we  lose  the  67  wards  from  our  analysis  in  which  no  applications  were 
submitted. This analysis, presented in Table 4, uses the same partitioning strategy as the previous 
table. The results reconcile the differences between Table 2, in which we saw mild pro-poor 
targeting  of  final  funding  allocations,  and  Table  3,  in  which  we  saw  applications  that  were 15 
 
strongly  regressive  across  districts.  The  strong  cross-district  regressivity  in  applications  is 
effectively neutralized by the formula that allocates funding across districts, which fixes the 
amount of money available per district at the outset of the entire program. The progressivity 
injected into project selection is entirely cross-district, suggesting that it is in fact the centralized 
component of this decentralized program that makes it mildly pro-poor. It is also noteworthy that 
variables, such as access to information and political activity are not correlated with the funding 
decisions  conditional  on  applications,  consistent  with  the  fact  that  the  centralized  funding 
formula to the districts did not include these characteristics. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the regressive nature of the decentralized applications process is 
counteracted by the progressive centralized district funding formula. Here, we plot the smoothed 
number  of  applications  and  the  acceptance  rate  over  the  distribution  of  poverty  headcounts 
across wards. The heterogeneity is tremendous: the richest wards submit almost six applications 
per 1,000 people compared with less than two among wards with the highest poverty rates. The 
acceptance rates, on the other hand, increase from below 12% to over 15% across that same 
span. This finding suggests that the heterogeneity in applications is not simply arising from the 
expected probability of funding: application rates are highest in places where the funding rates 
are lowest and vice versa.    
6.  Targeting Performance at the Village Level 
Our analysis of within-village targeting focuses on the Vulnerable Groups component 
(VG projects) of TASAF II because the data collected for this study was part of baseline data 
collection for the randomized study designed to assess the impact of this  component on the 
creation of small enterprises and household welfare.
13 The data at the household level allow the 
cross-examination of the earlier findings from the institutional data that we have used up to this 
point,  because  the  surveys  were  conducted  by  an  independent  firm.  To  the  extent  that  data 
coming from the program itself may contain accounting irregularities (ghost projects, efforts to 
cover up the misuse of funds, etc.), our own data collection allows us to independently verify the 
nature of targeting performance under this component of TASAF II.  
                                                       
13 Vulnerable Groups projects provide grants of 6-10 thousand dollars to groups of roughly 10 individuals from 
vulnerable households in order to finance an entrepreneurial activity. Typical activities for these groups are animal 
husbandry, beekeeping, tailoring, or the operation of milling machines. These projects thus generate an unusually 
private form of benefit relative to typical CDD programs. 16 
 
6.1. Village-level Poverty Targeting Using Detailed Household Surveys 
  We begin the analysis of the household-level data by using the subset of our observations 
among  which  detailed  household  surveys  were  collected.  These  data  allow  us  to  calculate 
household-level consumption aggregates, and therefore to conduct an analysis of poverty at the 
local level. We use sampling weights to make this sample representative of the population in the 
100 study villages.  
Figure 2 shows the CDF of the consumption aggregate by stratum. We can see that the 
village elite have the lowest likelihood of being poor followed by non-vulnerable individuals and 
TASAF II  VG group leaders. Vulnerable households, exogenously defined using the criteria 
devised by TASAF II, are poorer than non-vulnerable households and those who ended up in 
TASAF  II  VG groups  as  „rank and  file‟ members (i.e.  not  group leaders) form  the poorest 
stratum. Using a lower bound poverty line (of 18,000 Tanzanian Shillings per capita per month), 
fewer than 20% of village elites are defined as being in poverty, whereas almost 60% of TASAF 
VG group „rank and file‟ members are poor.  
The vulnerability criterion is, in and of itself, a decent targeting criterion: the poverty rate 
among vulnerable households is 10 percentage points higher than non-vulnerable households 
(51%  vs.  41%).  However,  inclusion  and  exclusion  errors  are  many:  there  are  many  poor 
households that are not defined as vulnerable and many vulnerable households who are not poor. 
The within-village targeting, conditional on the vulnerability criterion, is very different for group 
leaders (who are substantially richer than the average eligible beneficiary) and group rank and 
file (who are substantially poorer). Hence, while the villages do a good job of forming TASAF II 
VG groups that are poorer than the eligible population in general, group leaders (who comprise 
20-30% of the membership in these groups) are significantly richer than the average eligible 
household. Again, the combination of the targeting criteria from the center (vulnerability) and 
the within-village targeting process produces a targeting performance that is mildly pro-poor at 
the local level. 
To understand this process more clearly, we now proceed to examine group membership 
under the TASAF II VG component, using a sequence of probit regressions. Table 5 moves 
through three steps in the selection process, clustering standard errors at the village level. In 
columns (1) and (2), we compare vulnerable households to the entire population of the 100 
villages, thereby assessing the extent to which this centrally defined component of the targeting 17 
 
process is progressive. In column (1), we see that vulnerability as defined by TASAF is indeed 
pro-poor:  vulnerable  households  are,  on  average,  5.4  percentage  points  more  likely  to  be 
categorized as poor using our consumption aggregate and the lower-bound poverty line. Column 
(2) indicates that the vulnerability criterion identifies a group that is poorly educated rather than 
one that is poor conditional on education levels.  
Columns (3) and (4) compare the actual beneficiaries of TASAF II VG projects to the 
entire eligible sample, i.e. the population of vulnerable households, and show that those selected 
to be recipients of TASAF II VG funds are not significantly poorer than the overall eligible 
sample. Instead, within those eligible to benefit from VG projects, the very same attributes that 
were shown to be influential at the national-level also determine membership at the local level: 
those  who  are  more  politically  active  (measured  by  attendance  at  village  meetings),  well-
connected (measured by being a blood relative of village elites) and living closer to the village 
center are much more likely to be program beneficiaries than others. Finally, in columns (5) and 
(6),  we  compare  group  leaders  to  the  „rank  and  file‟  membership  and  find  that  they  are 
substantially less likely to be poor, and much more likely to have completed primary education 
and to own a radio or a mobile phone.  
These findings confirm the patterns of targeting performance found at the national level 
and presented above. Earlier, we found that wards with high levels of civic engagement and that 
party ties to district officials were more likely to receive funds at the national level. Here, we see 
that households engaged in local politics and have ties to local officials are more likely to be 
program beneficiaries as well. Hence, while the targeting of TASAF II projects is mildly pro-
poor both  at  the national  and  at  the local  level,  these projects  (and funds)  are  also  flowing 
towards households that have high levels of civic engagement and are connected to the local 
elites. Again, most of the successful targeting towards the poor in this decentralized development 
program appears to have come about because of the eligibility rules imposed by the center, rather 
than decisions taken at the local level. 
6.2. Awareness of TASAF  
  The  primary  empirical  contribution  of  our  national-level  analysis  is  the  fact  that  we 
observe the universe of applications and, hence, can separate the demand-driven components of 
the program from the approval process. While we do not have an exact analogy for applications 
at the individual level (the applications are submitted with the beneficiary group already defined 18 
 
under the VG component), we included a question in our census of 100 study villages that asks 
whether an individual had “ever heard of TASAF.” We suggest that this variable provides a 
similar  gateway  that  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  for  an  individual  to  be  a  program 
beneficiary: while many people who have heard of the program do not benefit, an individual who 
has not been informed as to the existence of the program cannot seek to benefit from it. Our data 
show that, among households eligible for TASAF II according to the exogenous vulnerability 
criteria, less than half of survey respondents had ever heard of the program. Non-vulnerable 
households, i.e. those who were ineligible to receive support under this program, were actually 
eight  percentage  points  more  likely  to  have  heard  of  the  program  than  the  eligible  non-
beneficiaries.  This  finding  is  dismaying,  indicating  that  half  of  the  target  population  under 
TASAF II had never heard of TASAF at baseline, by which time, as described earlier, VG 
groups had been formed and were ready to be funded in each of these 100 villages.  
We therefore conclude our empirical analysis by exploiting the village-level census of 
eligible households provided by the listing exercise in the 100 study villages with VG sub-
projects and examining the determinants of program awareness among eligible households, and 
the determinants of being a beneficiary among those who had heard of the program at baseline. 
This  analysis  uses  the  listing  data,  meaning  that  the  sample  size  for  the  analysis  is  greatly 
enhanced relative to  Table  5. However, detailed consumption data are not  available for this 
larger sample, so we proxy per capita consumption (and poverty) with several simpler questions: 
the number of days in the past week that a household consumed proteins (meat, eggs, or milk). 
  In Table 6 we analyze awareness of TASAF within the eligible non-beneficiary sample. 
In columns (1) through (4), we cumulatively include covariates intended to proxy for wealth 
(consumption),  information  (proximity  to  village  center,  education,  and  ownership  of 
radio/phone),  political  activity  (attendance  in  village  meetings)  and  political  connectedness 
(household members holding office, blood relation to village elites, and benefitting from other 
development projects for vulnerable groups). The last row of the table presents an F-test on the 
joint significance of the coefficients newly added in that column. This analysis of the degree of 
program awareness is interesting because it is distinct from the earlier targeting analyses in being 
entirely and more broadly regressive: not only is program awareness regressive in education and 
access  to  media,  as  well  as  political  activity  and  connectedness,  but  it  is  also  regressive  in 
consumption, with those households eating more protein-based diets more likely to be aware of 19 
 
the program (p-value<0.01). The majority of poorer, vulnerable, and marginalized households 
were  not  even  aware  of  the  program  that  was  designed  to  assist  them,  which  led  to  lower 
participation rates among the target population at the local level and caused a substantially lower 
number of applications from such areas at the national level. 
  Table 7 attempts to replicate the spirit of the national-level results on the probability of 
funding conditional on application (Table 4) by examining the determinants of actually receiving 
the program among households who were both eligible for and aware of TASAF at baseline. 
This is the group that is potentially capable of attempting to pull demand-driven benefits to 
themselves,  and hence gives a metric of within-village targeting efficiency  abstracting  away 
from both eligibility and informational requirements. Within this group, we see that selection is 
progressive on socio-economic variables such as consumption of proteins and radio or mobile 
phone ownership. Once again, however, we see that that political activity and connectedness are 
powerful  determinants  of  receiving  benefits.  Within  this  group,  all  else  equal,  an  individual 
belonging to a household wherein a member holds village office is 11% more likely to be a 
TASAF II beneficiary,  while a household that is already benefitting from another assistance 
project is 30% more likely to benefit from this new wave of projects. 
7.  Concluding Discussion and Policy Implications 
In this study, we provide new quantitative evidence that the demand-driven nature of 
community development programs, i.e. the requirement that a household or a community has to 
submit an application in order to become a beneficiary, may in fact be hindering the ability of 
such programs to reach the poor. Examining a large social funds project in Tanzania, we find that 
project applications are much more likely to come from wards in richer districts. This regressive 
pattern in applications is strongly correlated with access to media and information, as well as 
political activity measured by voter registration and turnout rates. There is also some evidence 
that wards dominated by the opposition party produce a lower number of applications per person. 
Hence,  the  evidence  at  the  national  level  suggests  that  information,  civic  engagement,  and 
political affiliation are important determinants of seeking project funding from TASAF II. 
Our analysis at the household level strongly mirrors these findings. We find that more 
than half of the eligible households had never heard of TASAF at baseline. Similar to the pattern 
for project applications at the ward level, we find that households who are more educated, have 20 
 
better access to media and information, active in village affairs, and related to village elites are 
substantially more likely to have heard of TASAF. Conditional on awareness, poorer households 
are  more  likely  to  become  program  beneficiaries,  but  the  influence  of  political  activity  on 
beneficiary status remains strong. 
The lack of applications from poor households and communities could be due to various 
factors, for which lack of information, proposed here, is but one. For example, it is possible that 
poor  households  (or  communities)  are  aware  of  the  program  but  are  unable  to  navigate  the 
system to produce valid applications. The evidence we have at the household level suggests that 
this may be part of the story: group leaders for the proposed income generating activities are 
substantially more educated, more likely to own phones and radios, and less likely to be poor 
than  the  “rank  and  file”  members  of  these  groups.
14  It  is  likely  that  these  individuals  are 
instrumental in putting together viable project proposals and navigating the application process.
15 
Another possibility is that households and communities that are aware of TASAF II (and 
able  to  apply)  nonetheless  decide  against  doing  so  because  of  the  costs  associated  with  the 
projects. Many programs, including TASAF II, require that communities contribute a share of 
the project costs. While this is a reasonable hypothesis, our data do not support it: when we 
analyze applications separately for projects that require cost-sharing (infrastructure and public 
works) and those that do not (vulnerable groups), we get the same application patterns reported 
above (see Appendix table A1 for results). Finally, low application rates among the poor might 
arise if they rationally decide not to apply due to a perceived low probability of being approved. 
The data available to us also argue against this idea. Approval rates are higher in poorer wards, 
meaning  that,  if  anything,  application  rates  from  these  areas  should  be  higher.  Hence  we 
conclude that the regressive pool of applications is likely to be arising from variation in access to 
                                                       
14 While these households are technically eligible, their average consumption levels are closer to non-vulnerable 
households than vulnerable ones. 
15 It is important to recognize that the Vulnerable Groups component of TASAF II is not a palliative poverty 
reduction program, but rather aims to reduce poverty by making grants to groups of vulnerable individuals, who are 
supposed to invest the funds into a proposed income generating activity, and thereby creating a sustainable stream of 
income.  If  the  successful  creation  of  such  small  enterprises  is  much  harder  when  groups  consist  entirely  of 
uneducated, inexperienced, and marginalized individuals, then the inclusion of better educated, well-connected, and 
richer individuals – i.e. the very definition of group leaders described above – may make sense. Considered in this 
light, what may look like „capture‟ or „mistargeting‟ may actually be the key to the longer-term success of these 
income  generating  activities.  An  ongoing  randomized  impact  evaluation  of  these  subprojects  will  permit  us  to 
analyze this issue in great detail in the near future. 21 
 
information (and perhaps in the ability to produce viable applications) and in civic engagement, 
rather than the high costs or low perceived benefits of applying. 
We found that a simple predetermined formula to allocate funds from the center to the 
districts was the main reason for the program‟s mild success in reaching the poor – reversing the 
regressive nature of the application pool. In this case, the heterogeneity in applications turned out 
to  be  almost  entirely  across-district,  meaning  that  a  district-level  funding  formula  is 
mechanically  effective  at  unwinding  this  regressivity.  In  a  different  context  with  stronger 
localized variation in  applications,  the formula would have  been less effective  and the  final 
funding allocations would have likely reflected the regressive application pattern. We conclude 
that program funds will be more likely to reach the poor to the extent that the center can directly 
target smaller administrative units – or induce local authorities to perform better by providing the 
necessary  information  and/or  incentives.
16  The  initial  propagation  of  information  about  the 
program and who are deemed eligible to benefit appear to be particularly important activities 
over which to maintain centralized control.  
Any  effort  to  quantify the incidence of spending in  CDD projects  must confront  the 
question of what attributes are in fact optimal to target. Such programs may have other goals that 
clash with a narrow focus on targeting those who are consumption poor – especially in the short 
run. When central governments use quantified metrics of poverty to channel funds, then central 
government provision almost tautologically improves poverty targeting if these same metrics are 
used to analyze spending incidence. However, not only the priorities of local communities may 
be different than those of the center, but so can their definition of who is poor, vulnerable, or 
deserving of social assistance (Alatas et al., 2011). One of the benefits of decentralized decision-
making and localized participatory development is to take advantage of idiosyncratic information 
at  the  local  level  (e.g.  Alderman,  2002).  Other  goals  include  improving  accountability, 
democratization of local politics by giving voice to previously marginalized groups, increasing 
social capital, and improving governance (Mansuri and Rao, forthcoming). These are broader 
goals that may well lead to a substantially improved allocation of social assistance funds in the 
                                                       
16 Ravallion (2000) finds that the improvement in the targeting performance of Trabajar II was in part due to the 
incentives provided by the center to the provinces for reaching poor areas. Baker and Grosh (1994) and Elbers et al. 
(2007) both find that targeting smaller administrative units, by using “poverty maps” or similar data, would produce 
large gains in poverty reduction. 22 
 
longer run, but are unlikely to be aided much by centrally dictated rules on program eligibility or 
funding allocations.  
Our study confirms findings in the literature with respect to the advantages enjoyed by 
local elites in decentralized programs, while suggesting a new culprit for this pattern. Despite the 
fact that community development projects are supposed to be designed to address the needs of 
the “poor, the marginalized, and the excluded”, we find that these are exactly the groups among 
whom the awareness of the program is lowest. The importance of civic engagement and political 
connections permeates our results. Unlike measures of poverty, variables measuring political 
activity and connectedness increase both the demand-side probability to seek out the program as 
well as the supply-side probability of selection. The final distribution of program benefits thus 
ends up skewed heavily towards districts and wards with high voter registration and turnout, and 
towards households that have direct connections to village political elites. While our data do not 
allow us to distinguish active „informational capture‟ by elites from the fact that marginalized 
groups are simply harder to sensitize, the informational regressivity that pervades this study 
motivates a strong focus on outreach efforts in CDD programs.  
Community development programs require their potential beneficiaries to be aware of 
and fully participate in the entire process, but the ability to do so is not equitably distributed 
across the population. Rather, it is significantly lower among the poor, the vulnerable, and the 
marginalized. Inducing meaningful participation at the local levels remains the big hurdle for 
these programs to truly succeed.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Targeting Outcome variables: Mean Std. Dev. Obs   Mean Std. Dev. Obs
TASAF spending per capita 3.072 3.788 2202 Household is Eligible (Vulnerable) 0.213 0.409 35114
Funded projects per 1000 ward residents 0.097 0.156 2202 Household is Beneficiary, among eligibles 0.131 0.337 12826
Project applications per 1000 ward residents 3.045 5.412 2202 Group leader, among beneficiaries 0.212 0.409 1681
Percentage of applications funded 12.995 25.094 2135 Heard of TASAF, among eligible non-beneficiaries 0.489 0.500 9459
Explanatory variables:
Poverty/Inequality: Poverty Headcount Ratio 0.342 0.185 2202 Household is poor 0.580 0.494 1509
Inequality (Theil_L) 0.137 0.041 2202 How many days meat eaten in past week 0.834 1.413 29884
Population, 000 21.658 19.042 2202 How many days eggs eaten in past week 0.260 1.059 29884
How many days milk drank in past week 1.830 2.838 29883
Information Percent Urban 21.990 37.207 2202 Inverse Distance to Village Population Center 0.032 0.077 35114
Fraction Illiterate 0.364 0.171 2202 Household Head has Primary Education 0.497 0.500 35114
Fraction with Radio or Phone 0.561 0.178 2202 Household owns a Radio or Phone 0.676 0.468 35114
Political Connectedness Ward Council CCM vote share 0.684 0.146 2202 Any household member holds village office 0.053 0.224 35114
Coparty dummy, Ward & Parliament 0.873 0.334 2202 Any HH member related to village elites 0.067 0.250 35114
Non-CCM Coparty, Ward & Parliament 0.016 0.125 2202 Any HH member belongs to other VG group 0.022 0.146 35114
Political Activity Ward Voter Turnout (votes/registered) 0.685 0.094 2202 Attended village meeting past 3 months 0.465 0.499 35114
Ward Voter Registration (reg./population) 0.481 0.111 2202




   
Poverty Targeting of TASAF Spending, Ward-Level Analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poverty Headcount Ratio 1.29*** 0.77* 0.04*** 0.03*
  (0.39) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02)
Population, 000 -0.05*** -0.00***
(0.01) 0.00
Fraction Urban 0.82*** 0.02**
(0.30) (0.01)
Fraction Illiterate 1.55** 0.08**
(0.66) (0.03)
Fraction with Radio or Phone -0.5 0.07**
(0.63) (0.03)
Inequality (Theil_L) 3.27* 0.19
(1.97) (0.13)
Ward Council CCM vote share 0.26 0.04
(0.57) (0.02)
Coparty dummy, Ward & Parliament 0.83*** 0.02**
(0.20) (0.01)
Non-CCM Coparty, Ward & Parliament -1.15*** -0.04***
(0.40) (0.01)
Ward Voter Turnout (votes/registered) 6.90*** 0.22***
(1.33) (0.06)
Ward Voter Registration (reg./population) 4.83*** 0.10***
(1.05) (0.04)
Constant 2.63*** -4.99*** 0.08*** -0.22***
(0.15) (1.75) (0.01) (0.08)
Observations 2202 2202 2202 2202
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Ward-level analysis weighted 
by ward population.  
TASAF spending per 
person, US $
TASAF projects per 








TASAF Applications Received per 1000 People in Ward:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Headcount Ratio -4.60*** -0.47 -10.22*** -3.83 0.63 0.7
  (0.65) (0.85) (2.63) (2.86) (0.74) (0.72)
Population, 000 -0.01 0 -0.03*
(0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Fraction Urban 1.42** 2.19 -0.39
(0.68) (3.05) (0.60)
Fraction Illiterate -0.34 4.51 -0.95
(0.90) (4.33) (0.98)
Fraction with Radio or Phone 5.75*** 10.03** 0.68
(1.14) (3.94) (1.55)
Inequality (Theil_L) -8.90*** -6.8 0.48
(3.08) (9.90) (2.55)
Ward Council CCM vote share -0.37 0.5 -0.87
(1.03) (3.32) (0.96)
Coparty dummy, Ward & Parliament -0.14 -1.93 0.02
(0.42) (2.21) (0.27)
Non-CCM Coparty, Ward & Parliament -2.11*** -4.20** -0.24
(0.53) (1.76) (0.34)
Ward Voter Turnout (votes/registered) 5.76*** 10.88* 1.45
(1.45) (6.32) (1.31)
Ward Voter Registration (reg./population) 8.45*** 11.94** 2.8
(2.51) (5.52) (2.29)
Constant 4.62*** -6.40*** 6.54*** -13.36* 12.34*** 10.80***
(0.32) (2.05) (1.07) (7.15) (1.54) (2.67)
Observations 2202 2202 119 119 2202 2202
District-Level Fixed Effects: N N N N Y Y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Ward-level analysis weighted by ward 
population.  Between regression run at the district level and weighted by district population.








Percentage of TASAF Applications Funded per Ward:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poverty Headcount Ratio 2.64 1.7 17.59*** 9.84 -1.9 -5.18
  (3.97) (3.73) (5.68) (10.30) (4.19) (4.45)
Population, 000 0.05 0 0.1
(0.09) 0.00 (0.10)
Percent Urban -4.25 0.62 -6.63
(3.70) (4.97) (4.64)
Fraction Illiterate -2.02 11.4 14.50*
(6.15) (20.68) (7.67)
Fraction with Radio or Phone -0.82 0.72 10.09
(5.04) (17.54) (7.60)
Inequality (Theil_L) -6.3 8.46 -13.1
(23.44) (31.10) (24.90)
Ward Council CCM vote share 8.87* 19.59* 9.48
(5.19) (9.88) (5.94)
Coparty dummy, Ward & Parliament 2.43 8.63*** -2.34
(1.59) (3.21) (2.15)
Non-CCM Coparty, Ward & Parliament 4.44 25.37** 5.23
(4.57) (10.44) (4.37)
Ward Voter Turnout (votes/registered) 3.85 27.7 -4.6
(10.08) (28.66) (12.65)
Ward Voter Registration (reg./population) 7.54 4.81 12.11
(9.93) (14.01) (9.42)
Constant 12.09*** -0.24 1.99 -43.17 7.47 -9.42
(1.81) (13.55) (2.28) (44.72) (4.62) (17.05)
Observations 2135 2135 119 119 2135 2135




Within Districts        
Only
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Ward-level analysis weighted by ward 
population.  Between regression run at the district level and weighted by district population.30 
 
Table 5 
Household-level Targeting of TASAF VG Membership.
Dependent Var:  Ever Heard of TASAF.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household is poor 0.054 -0.001 0.031 0.025 -0.118 -0.07
(0.027)** (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.029)*** (0.028)**
Inverse Distance to Village Population Center 0.159 0.502 -0.069
(0.23) (0.276)* (0.08)
Household Head has Primary Education -0.223 0.022 0.203
(0.035)*** (0.02) (0.028)***
Household owns a Radio or Phone -0.041 -0.014 0.094
(0.03) (0.02) (0.023)***
Attended village meeting past 3 months 0.017 0.102 0.03
(0.04) (0.019)*** (0.03)
Any household member holds village office 0.012 0.148 0.04
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Any HH member related to village elites 0.014 0.096 -0.055
(0.06) (0.047)** (0.04)
Any HH member belongs to other VG group 0.17 -0.011
(0.071)** (0.04)
Observations 1509 1509 1003 1003 716 716
Group leadership, estimated 
among group members
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard Errors in parentheses.  Marginal Effects probit with standard errors 
clustered at the village level, and all analyses weighted by ward-level population. 
Eligibility, estimated among all 
households
Group membership, estimated 






   
Awareness of TASAF: (among eligible non-beneficiaries)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
How many days meat eaten in past week 0.028 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.005)*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
How many days eggs eaten in past week 0.01 0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
How many days milk drank in past week 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.013
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Inverse Distance to Village Population Center 0.017 0.007 0
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household Head has Primary Education 0.225 0.223 0.216
(0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Household owns a Radio or Phone 0.144 0.138 0.134
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Attended village meeting past 3 months 0.133 0.127
(0.015)*** (0.015)***
Any household member holds village office 0.26
(0.030)***
Any HH member related to village elites 0.102
(0.024)***
Any HH member belongs to other VG group 0.05
(0.04)
Observations 9459 9459 9459 9459
Chi-sq on F-Test that sum of additional vars = 0  32.69*** 45.55*** 75.99*** 65.48***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard Errors in parentheses.  Marginal Effects probit with standard errors 




     
       
         
 
 
   
Determinants of Being a VG Beneficiary  (among eligible households aware of TASAF.)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
How many days meat eaten in past week -0.032 -0.029 -0.027 -0.027
(0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
How many days eggs eaten in past week -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.028
(0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
How many days milk drank in past week -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Inverse of Distance to Village Population Center 0.254 0.227 0.242
(0.090)*** (0.088)** (0.085)***
Household Head has Primary Education 0.01 0.009 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Household owns a Radio or Phone -0.053 -0.056 -0.058
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Attended village meeting past 3 months 0.102 0.094
(0.016)*** (0.016)***
Any household member holds village office 0.114
(0.028)***
Any HH member related to village elites 0.015
(0.02)
Any HH member belongs to other VG group 0.296
(0.043)***
Observations 5916 5916 5916 5916
Chi-sq on F-Test that sum of  additional vars = 0  52.93*** 4.72** 40.53*** 74.33***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard Errors in parentheses.  Marginal Effects probit with standard errors 
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APPENDIX. 
Table A1: Applications for projects that do and do not require cost sharing by applicants: 
 
 
Applications for projects 
that DO require cost-
sharing (FI & SP)
Applications for projects 
that do NOT require cost-
sharing (VG)
Poverty Headcount Ratio -0.32 -0.15
  (0.61) (0.28)
Population, 000 0 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Percent Urban 0.76 0.66***
(0.50) (0.24)
Fraction Illiterate -0.05 -0.3
(0.63) (0.36)
Fraction with Radio or Phone 3.40*** 2.35***
(0.78) (0.43)
Inequality (Theil_L) -5.78*** -3.12***
(2.18) (1.07)
Ward Council CCM vote share -0.21 -0.16
(0.73) (0.35)
Coparty dummy, Ward & Parliament -0.27 0.13
(0.31) (0.12)
Non-CCM Coparty, Ward & Parliament -1.43*** -0.68***
(0.36) (0.22)
Ward Voter Turnout (votes/registered) 3.69*** 2.07***
(1.02) (0.55)
Ward Voter Registration (reg./population) 6.00*** 2.45***
(1.84) (0.76)
Observations 2202 2202
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Ward-level analysis weighted by 
ward population. 